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Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 35 of Security Council resolution 2232 (2015), in which the Council requested me to report every 120 days on the implementation of the resolution, including on the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and paragraph 17 of resolution 2245 (2015), in which the Council requested me to report regularly on the implementation of that resolution, specifically on any challenges faced by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) in carrying out its mandate. The report covers major developments in Somalia during the period from 1 January to 30 April 2016.

II. Political and security overview

A. Political developments

2. Somali leaders agreed on the format of the electoral process scheduled for August 2016. On 28 January, after several weeks of consultations with regional stakeholders had failed to reach a consensus, the Federal Government of Somalia announced an executive decision whereby a 275-member lower house would be elected by broad-based electoral colleges rather than being chosen only by clan elders, as in 2012. The seats would still be allocated to clans on the basis of the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula. Meanwhile, an upper house would be created with 48 seats divided equally among the six federal states, plus three additional seats each for Somaliland and Puntland. A total of 30 per cent of electoral college seats and of the seats in both houses of the Federal Parliament would be reserved for women.

3. The decision of the Federal Government was accepted by the Jubba, South-West and Galmudug Interim Administrations as a necessary step to renew the mandate of the federal institutions and as a bridge to universal elections in 2020. However, the Government of Puntland expressed strong opposition to the use of the 4.5 formula, which many Puntlanders believe disadvantages their majority clan. An agreement reached with the Federal Government in Garoowe on 3 April facilitated the acceptance by Puntland of the electoral process.

4. On 12 April, the National Leadership Forum agreed on detailed modalities for the 2016 electoral process. The Forum also agreed to adopt, at its meeting in May, a

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political road map for the period 2016-2020, comprising benchmarks and timelines leading to universal elections in 2020. Meanwhile, the Federal Parliament began deliberating on the electoral process modalities following a presentation by the Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, on 30 April.

5. The business of the Federal Parliament was otherwise dominated by security concerns. After hearings with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Internal Security and commanders of the security forces, it issued a resolution calling upon the Federal Government to adopt a series of measures to stabilize the security situation. On 6 April, in Mogadishu, the Federal Government launched an inclusive "right path" national strategy for countering violent extremism.

6. There was notable progress in efforts to ensure the inclusion and representation of interim regional administrations. On 25 March, the President of the Interim Jubba Administration, Sheikh Ahmed Islam "Madobe", and opposition leaders from the Marehan subclan announced an important reconciliation agreement in a 10-point communiqué in which, among other things, the parties committed themselves to a fair distribution of positions for all Juba clans and further militia integration. Pursuant to the agreement, some 50 armed members of the Barre Hirale militia returned to Kismaayo. The agreement also paves the way for the formation of a new Interim Jubba Administration Cabinet. Meanwhile, the Interim South-West Administration regional assembly, which is 21 per cent female, held its first plenary session on 10 March under the leadership of the Speaker, Abdulkadir Sharif "Sheikhuna".

7. In Mudug, plans for a reconciliation conference between the Galmudug Interim Administration and the group Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a were put in place with the support of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and funding from the United Nations. The conference will seek agreement on the power-sharing, reintegration of security forces and the establishment of the Galmudug Interim Administration capital in Dhuusamarreeb, which is controlled by Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a. However, the start of the conference was delayed by internal clashes within Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a.

8. The process to form the only remaining federal member state in Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe faced challenges. A state-formation conference that had been launched on 12 January in Jawhar, Shabelle Dhexe, encountered serious difficulties over clan representation and was boycotted by a major clan. Repeated visits by senior federal officials, including the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, did not succeed in resolving the issues, although the state-formation conference was relaunched on 12 April. UNSOM continues to use its good offices to facilitate a Somali-brokered solution.

9. In "Somaliland", the political scene continued to be dominated by preparations for the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2017. On 16 January, the National Electoral Commission launched a biometric voter registration process that was later temporarily suspended owing to the continuing drought. Meanwhile, no progress was reported on talks between the "Somaliland" authorities and the Federal Government. My Special Representative paid his first visit to "Somaliland" on 14 and 15 March.

B. Security developments

10. The security situation worsened during the first half of the reporting period, as Al-Shabaab stepped up asymmetric and conventional attacks. At the same time, the Somali security forces, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other partners also inflicted heavy losses on the group, especially in March and April.

11. Mogadishu witnessed an increase in assassinations, especially in April, with Somali government personnel targeted the most. There were three complex attacks during the reporting period. Attacks at the Lido beach in Mogadishu on 21 January and on the Somali Youth League hotel and peace garden on 26 February killed more than 45 people, including a United Nations national staff member, and injured 80 others. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the incidents, as well as for a coordinated twin bombing in Baidoa, Bay region, on 28 February, which killed 30 people and injured 60. In another worrisome development, a pro-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) website reported on 25 April that ISIL fighters in Somalia had carried out their first attack in Somalia, hitting an AMISOM convoy with an improvised explosive device on the outskirts of Mogadishu. AMISOM acknowledged the explosion, but denied that the convoy had been hit.

12. There was an increase in mortar attacks, including against the presidential compound, Villa Somalia, and airports co-located with AMISOM and United Nations offices. The AMISOM protected area of Mogadishu International Airport sustained mortar attacks on 1 January and 11 February, resulting in injuries to two AMISOM soldiers. Villa Somalia was similarly targeted on 7 January, 1 and 25 February and 3 and 7 April, leaving at least 12 people dead and 22 injured, including a member of Parliament. Kismaayo airport sustained mortar attacks on 14 and 27 February, while several rounds landed in the perimeter of the Baidoa airstrip on 21 February. There were no casualties from those attacks.

13. Two unsuccessful bombings demonstrated new tactics on the part of Al-Shabaab. On 2 February, an explosive device hidden inside a laptop computer detonated on a commercial flight from Mogadishu to Djibouti. The late departure of the plane saved many lives, given that the timed explosion occurred before the cabin was fully pressurized. The suicide bomber was ejected in mid-flight from the plane, which landed safely in Mogadishu. Two passengers sustained minor injuries. On 7 March, at Beledweyne airport, a small detonation occurred during a luggage search by AMISOM soldiers. Explosives were found hidden inside computer equipment, which was scheduled to be shipped as cargo to Mogadishu.

14. AMISOM and the Somali national army sustained a series of attacks by Al-Shabaab in January and February. On 15 January, hundreds of Al-Shabaab fighters raided an AMISOM base in El Adde, Gedo region, killing several soldiers and looting weapons and military vehicles. Later in January, AMISOM vacated its base at Ceel Cade and those in Badhaadhe and Bulo Gaduud, Juba Hoose, citing tactical reasons. On 16 February, Al-Shabaab launched a heavy assault on AMISOM and Somali national army positions in the town of Afgooye, only 30 km north of Mogadishu.

15. There were some strategic military successes in March. A drone strike by the United States of America hit a training camp in Raaso, Hiraan region, on 5 March, reportedly killing more than 150 newly recruited fighters and some senior commanders. A joint United States-Somali military operation in Juba Dhexe and

Juba Hoose carried out from 31 March to 2 April resulted in the killing of a senior Al-Shabaab leader, Hassan Ali Dhoore. Also in early March, an attempted large-scale advance by Al-Shabaab into Mudug and Puntland was repelled by local security forces. The Government of Puntland reported that its forces had killed at least 67 Al-Shabaab militants and detained 100, while the Galmudug Interim Administration announced that its forces had killed 115 and captured 110 Al-Shabaab militants.

16. Early in April, AMISOM resumed major offensive operations under the third phase of Operation Juba Corridor, with the aim of destroying Al-Shabaab strongholds and cutting their supply routes in central Somalia. As part of this operation, the town of Adan Yabal, Shabelle Dhexe region, and the village of Galcad, Galguduud region, were liberated on 6 and 11 April, respectively.

III. Support for peacebuilding and State-building efforts

A. International coordination and political support

17. My Special Representative continued to work in close coordination with Member States maintaining diplomatic representations in Mogadishu or Nairobi, convening regular meetings to harmonize views on the key issues and coordinate partner support for key political processes. In particular, and under the leadership of my Special Representative, international partners coordinated support for the 2016 electoral process, including by deploying an international delegation to the capitals of the emerging federal member states from 4 to 16 February to help to foster acceptance of the decision of the Federal Government on an electoral model so as to enable the timely preparation and implementation of the process.

18. The third ministerial meeting of the High-level Partnership Forum was hosted by the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in Istanbul, Turkey, on 23 and 24 February. The meeting, which was co-chaired by the President of Somalia and the Deputy Secretary-General, was attended by 46 Member States and 11 international organizations. The meeting enabled Somalia and the international community to reflect on the achievements and challenges faced in the implementation of the peacebuilding and State-building process in Somalia and to identify key deliverables for 2016 and beyond. The Forum called for the timely implementation of the electoral process and security sector reform, including the development of a new national security architecture. The Government of Puntland did not participate in the meeting's political discussions owing to its opposition to the 2016 electoral model.

B. Inclusive politics

19. Much work remains to be done in order to achieve a common vision of the federal system in Somalia. However, the reporting period saw some progress in defining the way forward, in particular with respect to the revision of the Provisional Federal Constitution of 2012.

Constitution

20. In January, constitutional experts supported by UNSOM and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) visited Mogadishu and met with the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Federal Parliament, the Oversight Committee and the Minister of Constitutional Affairs. They helped Somali stakeholders to reach an agreement on key topics and provided options for addressing some contentious issues, including the role of the upper house, executive branch powers, the distribution of power between the federal and state levels, revenue-sharing and the status of Mogadishu.

21. On 15 February, the Speaker of the Federal Parliament outlined a road map for the constitutional review process. The road map includes consultations led by the Oversight Committee with the regional assemblies, involving the executives and civil society, a national constitutional conference to be held in Garoowe, Puntland, from 25 May to 5 June, and a drafting retreat by the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission to finalize draft amendments. Also on 15 February, the Committee submitted amendments to 10 of 15 chapters of the Provisional Federal Constitution, addressing mostly technical issues, to the Federal Parliament. Speakers from the South-West, Jubba and Galmudug regional assemblies attended the parliamentary sitting. Puntland did not participate and instead issued a statement on 21 February in which it said that the resolution of long-standing grievances should precede any participation by it to the current review.

22. The first public outreach and civic education exercise on the constitutional review process was conducted in Baidoa from 14 to 17 March. The event was hosted by the Interim South-West Administration and organized by the Federal Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, with UNDP assistance.

23. The Federal Government continued consultations with the existing and emerging federal member states on substantive aspects of the federal system, including financial and fiscal arrangements, the judiciary, the security sector and the revision of the Federal Provisional Constitution. In addition, the Boundaries and Federation Commission began introductory meetings on federal state boundary delimitation criteria that will be submitted to the Federal Parliament. With United Nations support, the Commission has also drafted a strategic framework on federalism that focuses on five interconnected pillars: outreach to government stakeholders on clarity of roles and responsibilities; the promotion of the national dialogue process; clarity on federalism and other models; the production of boundary demarcation criteria; and the evolution of a dispute resolution platform.

Elections

24. Consistent with the Mogadishu Declaration of 16 December 2015, government and international partners at the High-level Partnership Forum in February endorsed a twin-track approach comprising the 2016 electoral process and universal elections by 2020, the latter to be organized by the National Independent Electoral Commission.

25. The United Nations continued to support the institutional development of the National Independent Electoral Commission through training programmes, including those on gender-responsive elections and governance and leadership, international

workshops organized jointly with the UNDP Arab States Regional Programme and participation in a voter registration study hosted by the Electoral Commission of South Africa. In the immediate term, UNSOM and UNDP continue to support the preparations and planning for the 2016 electoral process.

C. Rule of law and security institutions

26. Considerable progress was made in developing a federal framework for the rule of law and security institutions. A draft national security policy was developed on the basis of a national threat assessment. The draft policy was circulated to the leaders of the existing and emerging federal member states during the National Leadership Forum on 11 April and will be considered in detail at its next session, in May. In the meantime, technical-level workshops to discuss the policy will be held in the regional capitals.

27. During a three-day consultative workshop in March, supported by UNSOM, AMISOM and UNDP, the Federal Government and the regional states agreed on the main features of a federal policing model for Somalia. The proposed police system will have a two-tier, civilian-administered structure at the federal and state levels. This agreement constitutes a key building block in establishing viable police services throughout Somalia and provides a much-needed nationally owned framework for structured police support. The recently concluded joint World Bank and UNSOM security and justice public expenditure review provided valuable information on the affordability and sustainability of different models.

28. Militia integration is progressing, albeit slowly, in line with the integration plan of the Federal Government. Both it and the Somali national army have increased support and enhanced training to address these challenges in Kismaayo. UNSOM and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) are seeking to implement a support package as swiftly as possible for the integration of 3,000 Puntland troops into the Somali national army.

29. The military stipends project, funded by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for Somali national army soldiers continues. During the reporting period, 18,818 registered soldiers were paid stipends totalling $2.9 million. The regular payment of salaries for security personnel continues to be a major issue, with direct implications for the country's security situation. Army salaries are estimated to be between 6 and 13 months in arrears, and salaries for the police up to 15 months.

30. The European Union provided $5.5 million in support of police stipends and committed itself to delivering funding for an additional year, until April/May 2017. With the support of the European Union, 6,354 federal police officers were paid eight months' worth of outstanding stipends. Stipend payments to all eligible officers are expected to be completed by April 2016. Concurrently, the Department for International Development of the Government of the United Kingdom provides stipends to regional police officers in Baidoa and Kismaayo who complete a three-month training course conducted through the AMISOM police component. At present, 397 officers of the 1,200 expected graduates are receiving stipends.

31. The review of the draft Heegan (Readiness) Plan for the development of the Somali police force continues, including on the new policing model. The non-lethal

support package for the Somali police was updated in January. Germany has pledged funding for the package, amounting to $2 million through UNOPS.

32. Progress was also made in weapons and ammunition management following a workshop facilitated by UNSOM and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, held from 7 to 11 February and attended by representatives of the Somali national army, the Somali police force, the National Intelligence and Security Agency and the Custodial Corps. The Federal Government agreed to begin deploying mobile weapons-marking and registration teams, harmonizing registration databases, improving the army weapons reception and storage area within Mogadishu International Airport and developing legal frameworks. The United Nations Mine Action Service will provide technical support to these activities, which will support the aim of the Federal Government to meet the terms for the partial lifting of the arms embargo.

33. The United Nations Mine Action Service donated vehicles and equipment to the Ministry of Internal Security to support the training and operations of police bomb-disposal teams dealing with incidents relating to improvised explosive device and the clearance of unexploded ordnance. At the nineteenth International Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors and United Nations Advisers, held in Geneva from 16 to 19 February, the Somali Explosive Management Authority launched the Badbaado (Protection) Plan for explosive hazard management.

34. On 18 February, the Federal Government held the official stone-laying of the Mogadishu prison and court complex, which is supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and UNOPS. The court is intended to adjudicate high-security cases in the civilian justice system, including cases against members of Al-Shabaab. On 1 March, the Interim South-West Administration launched a rehabilitation pilot project financed by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund for high-risk prisoners in Baidoa.

35. The community development projects of the Federal Government to reintegrate former combatants received a boost when the Government of Japan agreed to fund 20 reinsertion projects in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismaayo and Beledweyne. Half of the beneficiaries will be ex-combatants nearing the end of their rehabilitation process, with the remaining other half from the community. In Kismaayo, the Federal Government, the Interim Jubba Administration, the German Embassy and the International Organization for Migration concluded an agreement to establish a transitional facility for disengaged Al-Shabaab operatives, with funding from the Government of Germany.

36. With UNSOM technical assistance, the Federal Government completed the draft Naqude (Captain) Plan to train and equip the navy and coast guard. UNSOM is facilitating the ratification of a revised Somali maritime code with the Federal Government. At the request of the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, UNSOM will help to mobilize international support to counter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing off the Somali coast.

D. Economic foundations

37. The reporting period saw noticeable progress in economic governance and policy priorities. A bill to combat the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism was signed into law by the President on 21 February. The Federal Parliament had passed the bill on 26 December 2015, enabling the Central Bank of Somalia to put in place measures to improve the financial regulatory environment and safeguard remittances from the diaspora. The President appointed two Bank board members to complete the management team that will approve important pending regulations.

38. In recognition of the progress achieved in macroeconomic management, on 6 April, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it would recommend a 12-month staff-monitored programme, which would help to establish the foundations for the full reengagement of international financial institutions in Somalia within the framework of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative. The programme will not involve direct financial support, but will instead be a necessary step towards a potential future IMF loan programme. Less positively, the membership application of Somalia to join the East African Community was rejected on 3 March as a result of insecurity, depriving Somalia of an opportunity to revive its economy through regional integration and access to a market with 170 million people.

39. The export of live animals to Gulf nations continues to be the leading foreign exchange earner for Somalia. According to data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in 2015, Somalia exported 4.9 million goats and sheep, 295,000 head of cattle and 72,000 camels, bringing an estimated $384 million in revenue for livestock owners. The livestock sector continues to offer significant growth potential, boosted by continued export-focused interventions, good prices and growing markets in the Middle East. Earnings from livestock account for 40 per cent of the gross domestic product.

40. On 23 January, the Federal Deputy Prime Minister, in coordination with FAO, launched a national biodiversity strategy and action plan to serve as a road map for balancing the consumption and conservation of resources that are derived from biodiversity.

41. A forum for agriculture ministers, held in Mogadishu in January, marked a historic milestone. For the first time, federal and regional ministries of agriculture gathered to implement a harmonized strategy to support agricultural growth and food security throughout Somalia, increase resource mobilization and strengthen accountability with local and international partners.

E. Revenue and services

42. The Federal Government continued its efforts to draft a national development plan for the period 2017-2019, organizing extensive consultations in the regions. Notably, it has prioritized critical issues, including social protection, nutrition and young people, as it aligns national priorities with the Sustainable Development Goals.

43. Government leadership in inclusive consultations with regional authorities enabled the development of a bottom-up health sector strategic plan and a multisectoral national water, sanitation and hygiene policy, which are intended to enhance the provision of critical social services. Data-collection efforts, such as the first government-led school census published in early 2016, provided a critical baseline for interventions targeting Somali children.

44. Saudi Arabia provided $50 million to Somalia: $20 million for budget support and $30 million in investments. Officials from the Federal Ministry of Finance confirmed the receipt of the support financing, helping to close a gap in the 2016 budget.

45. The Governor of the Central Bank emphasized the need for a new currency for Somalia, although concerns remain about the capacity of the Federal Government to disseminate and manage a new currency.

F. Cross-cutting issues

Community recovery

46. On 19 March, the President launched the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance. The Framework outlines a community-led process for the formation of representative administrations in districts and consists of four components: social healing, peace dividends, civic dialogues and local governance. Prior to the launch, the Ministry of the Interior and Federal Affairs conducted a consultation exercise with representatives of the state authorities and civil society.

47. In January, ministers of the interior of the Interim Jubba and South-West Administrations convened meetings with their respective district officials to review district stability assessments and discuss the prioritization of activities. Community-recovery initiatives were conducted in Kismaayo and Afmadow and Baraawe, involving a broad range of local stakeholders, including representatives of civil society, local authorities and the private sector. The projects were supported by the United States Agency for International Development. Meanwhile, AMISOM continued to implement early-recovery projects at the community level that included support for health facilities in Beledweyne, Baardheere and Taraka.

48. The Peacebuilding Fund provided $2 million in direct support for local administrations through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility national window. This modality was used by UNDP to facilitate payments for 11 district administrations in the southern and central area. The Facility will make it easier to continue payments for this and other projects, effectively contributing to the establishment of a financially functional federal system.

49. Initiatives to empower Somali young people have been gaining momentum and remain high on the agenda of the Federal Government. The United Nations Population Fund is supporting the Federal Government in the development of a national youth policy through funding and technical support to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, which is leading the process. UNSOM held an event for young people in Mogadishu, which brought together 250 representatives of young people, 75 of whom were delegates from the regional level, to agree on specific recommendations to implement Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) on youth and peace and security in Somalia. During a side event on investing in Somali

young people, held at the High-level Partnership Forum in Istanbul, the Deputy Secretary-General launched a United Nations strategy for young people in Somalia and announced the creation of a fund for them.

Human rights

50. Operations by security forces resulted in 105 reported civilian casualties. Of those casualties, 28 deaths and 45 injuries were attributed to the Somali security forces, 3 deaths to AMISOM and 29 deaths to air strikes by the Kenyan military operating bilaterally. In addition, two civilians were reportedly injured by United States helicopter air strikes. One case of rape involving the Somali security forces was documented. Civilian casualties attributed to Al-Shabaab or unidentified individuals totalled 121 deaths and 230 injuries. Thirty-two abductions were suspected to have been carried out by Al-Shabaab, which released 50 captives on 3 April.

51. In addition to civilian casualties, air strikes by the Kenyan military from 15 to 23 January in the Gedo region reportedly resulted in the killing of livestock and the destruction of water wells and houses. In this regard, allegations of cluster munitions were reported by the media and local communities. However, the Government of Kenya has officially denied them. Unexploded sub-munitions are reported to have been used by Al-Shabaab as improvised explosive devices during attacks. On 31 January, the Federal Government announced a committee to investigate the impact of the air strikes, but the committee has yet to begin its work.

52. Seventeen death sentences were carried out, including seven in Somaliland (including three civilians), four in Mogadishu and two in Puntland. Four individuals were summarily executed by authorities without due process, one by the Interim South-West Administration and three by the Interim Jubba Administration.

53. At a public trial, the First Instance Military Court in Mogadishu sentenced Hassan Hanafi to death, a former Al-Shabaab journalist and media officer, for his involvement in the killing of at least five journalists. On 26 March, the High Military Court in Mogadishu confirmed the death sentence, which was carried out on 11 April.

54. A total of 900 people were arrested, most of them arbitrarily, in various parts of Somalia for association with Al-Shabaab. Of those arrested, 613 were released, while 287 remained in detention pending further investigation, including 68 juveniles forcefully enrolled by Al-Shabaab.

55. In January, the Human Rights Council reviewed the human rights record of Somalia under the universal periodic review process. The Council noted gains made since the last evaluation in 2011, including the adoption of action plans to implement the human rights road map to end sexual violence in conflict and on the rights of children.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

56. The political participation and security of Somali women received much-needed attention, creating new momentum for action ahead of the 2016 electoral process. A meeting on women and peace and security at the High-level Partnership Forum in Istanbul brought the Federal Government and its partners together and highlighted the urgency of strategic intervention and further investment in the

women and peace and security agenda, including women's political participation. During plenary deliberations at the Forum, the Federal Government highlighted its plans to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.

57. Women's participation in the 2016 electoral process was the main focus of the 2016 International Women's Day celebration. Women leaders, including ministers, members of Parliament and representatives of civil society organizations, shared their concerns at the open day organized by the Special Representative, a European Union-United Nations joint panel discussion and during activities organized by civil society organizations and ministries for women throughout the country.

Child protection

58. Children continued to be disproportionately affected by conflict in Somalia. The United Nations-led country task force on monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict documented 1,101 violations affecting 993 children (166 girls and 827 boys) in 488 incidents between 1 January and 31 March. This is an increase from the previous quarter. The majority of the violations concerned the recruitment and use (472), abduction (268) and killing and maiming (281), committed mostly by Al-Shabaab, the army and clan militias.

59. The United Nations provided support to the Government of Puntland in the handling of children captured following military operations against Al-Shabaab in March. Up to 50 of those captured may be under 18 years of age. UNSOM and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) are also providing support to the Galmudug Interim Administration to assist in the rehabilitation of children captured in similar military operations. Preliminary findings indicate that the number of children captured in both the Puntland and Mudug operations is some 50 per cent of 216 detainees.

60. The United Nations continues to provide support to the Federal Government on the implementation of the action plans to end and prevent the recruitment and use and killing and maiming of children. On 15 March, the UNSOM Child Protection Unit and UNICEF supported the finalization by the Somali national army of a one-year workplan to support their implementation.

Prevention of sexual violence

61. Progress in the implementation of the national action plan on ending sexual violence in conflict includes the finalization of a sexual offences bill, which is now before Cabinet, and the development of a pilot women and children protection unit within the Somali police force.

62. Challenges facing the implementation of the national action plan include a lack of adequate coordination, limited donor resources and the inadequate engagement by the interim regional administrations. It has been agreed that, in the second quarter of 2016, the focus of work will be to mobilize additional resources and to establish a coordination cell embedded within the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development in order to enhance coordination with stakeholders.

Targeted sanctions

63. In his briefing to the Council on 18 February, the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea highlighted some of the latest findings of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. The findings indicated that, among the key challenges posing a threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia, was the increased international interest in the country's rich maritime and mineral resources, which has not been matched by adequate efforts to manage and protect them. Meanwhile, on 14 March, the Committee adopted a second implementation assistance notice to assist Member States and other relevant actors in effectively implementing the arms embargoes in place for Eritrea and Somalia.

IV. Humanitarian situation

64. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains fragile. The most recent assessment of the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit, released in February, confirmed persistently high and alarming levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. An estimated 4.7 million people, or 38 per cent of the population, are food insecure or in crisis, with nearly 1 million people unable to meet minimum food needs. Internally displaced persons comprise more than two thirds of acutely food insecure people. Some 305,000 children under five years of age are acutely malnourished, 58,300 of whom could face death if they do not receive urgent treatment.

65. Severe drought exacerbated by El Niño conditions has hit parts of Puntland and Somaliland, affecting 350,000 people, especially in the Awdal, Bari, Nugaal, Sanaag, Sool and Woqooyi Galbeed regions. A further 1.3 million people risk slipping into acute food insecurity if they do not receive assistance. The situation is expected to worsen owing to the depletion of available water resources in affected areas and a poor forecast for the coming rainy season. The drought conditions follow four successive seasons of below-average rains in parts of Somaliland (spanning two years) and a below-average Deyr rainy season in Puntland (October to December 2015). Early forecasts indicate an increased likelihood of near-normal to below-normal Gu rains (April to June) in Somaliland and northern parts of Puntland, which will have a further negative impact on the affected people who are struggling to meet their daily needs.

66. Humanitarian partners are providing critical life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable, notwithstanding limited resources to avert a deterioration in the situation. The Central Emergency Response Fund has released $11 million to support the scaling-up of critical life-saving humanitarian assistance in the drought-affected areas. The Humanitarian Coordinator has allocated an additional $6.5 million from the Somalia Humanitarian Fund. To date, the 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan has received $102.9 million, or 12 per cent, of the $885 million dollars requested.

67. Health conditions remain worrisome, with some 3.2 million people in need of access to emergency health services. As of January 2016, at least 10 health facilities had reduced their services or closed owing to insufficient funding, according to non-governmental organizations. Partners continue to face difficulties in providing life-saving health services at the scale required. Basic health posts and clinics are

struggling to meet primary health needs, and many organizations have withdrawn health workers from high-need areas for lack of funds.

68. Work continued in order to find durable solutions to the plight of the 1.1 million internally displaced persons in Somalia. The humanitarian country team is working on an initiative that is aimed at alleviating the hardship of the internally displaced persons through return, resettlement or local integration and will depend heavily on the political will of the authorities. The draft national development plan of the Federal Government includes durable solutions on internally displaced persons under its resilience pillar.

69. Humanitarian access remains a challenge owing to increasing insecurity, limited capacity and funding. The operating environment in Somalia remains dangerous and challenging, with attacks against humanitarians on the rise, even in areas where they have long had access. In January and February alone, 22 violent incidents had a direct impact on humanitarian organizations, accounting for the death of one humanitarian worker, the injury of two others and the physical assault and detention of five more.

V. Support to the African Union Mission in Somalia, the national army and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

70. Against the backdrop of increasingly sophisticated attacks by Al-Shabaab, the participants in a summit of Heads of State and Government of AMISOM troop-contributing countries, held in Djibouti on 28 February 2016, stressed the need for improved command and control. They also noted with concern the decision by the European Union to reduce financial support to the AMISOM troop allowance by 20 per cent at a crucial juncture. In addition, they emphasized the need for better coordination of operations and logistics between AMISOM, the national security forces and UNSOS.

71. Efforts to improve the performance of AMISOM were also the focus of a meeting of the African Union-United Nations joint task force on peace and security, held on 22 March. Following up on the work of the joint task force, a joint African Union-United Nations working group was established to develop options for improving the effectiveness of AMISOM operations and securing predictable funding for its uniformed personnel. During the inaugural meeting, held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 19 April, the working group identified priority initiatives aimed at improving AMISOM command and control.

72. On 17 March, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia met the President and key security donors to discuss salaries and stipends and national security architecture. The Federal Government committed itself to delivering a consolidated security budget and promptly paying salary arrears. The Ministry of Finance presented a report on the financial constraints and the payment of salaries and stipends in 2015, including arrangements for the payment of arrears. The meeting marked a shift in the attitude of the Federal Government with regard to salary payment, with a recognition of the seriousness of the payment crisis and a willingness to take a more assertive stance with the security agencies.

73. As requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2245 (2015), UNSOS is developing two separate quantifiable compacts for the delivery of support to UNSOM and AMISOM, both of which are in the final drafting stage. Building on the performance management framework of the Department of Field Support, the compacts include objectives, measures and targets for the various areas in which UNSOS delivers services, developed jointly with the clients of UNSOS. The compacts also cover performance measures for resource management, compliance with rules and regulations and normative policies and standards.

74. During the senior leadership coordination forum, held in Mogadishu on 16 March, the Special Representative of the Chair of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia agreed on four joint priorities that would guide the support operations of UNSOS moving forward: support for the electoral process and electoral security, support for the Somali security sector, community recovery and extension of State authority, and the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy.

75. The umbrella memorandum of understanding between the African Union and the United Nations has been amended, and signed, to align it with recent Security Council resolutions. Discussions are continuing in order to finalize the tripartite memorandum of understanding between the African Union, the United Nations and troop- and police-contributing countries, which will set out the administrative, logistical and financial terms and conditions to govern the reimbursement of eligible contingent-owned equipment provided by the contributing countries in support of AMISOM. The new framework will allow UNSOS to better support AMISOM through the joint formulation of force requirements and by ensuring that only equipment that has been verified by tripartite signatories will be supported by UNSOS, in line with Council resolution 2245 (2015).

76. The lack of access to main supply routes, however, remains a challenge, with UNSOS continuing to supply 70 per cent of AMISOM forward operating bases and other locations by air. The introduction of military air assets is an important aspect of the efforts of AMISOM to adopt a more mobile and offensive posture. The pledges by Kenya and Ethiopia of two and three attack helicopters, respectively, will be an important contribution in this regard. A continuing gap, however, remains the provision or reimbursement of ammunition, which falls outside the scope of the logistics support package and would have to be covered by either the troop-contributing countries or through bilateral assistance from Member States. In support efforts to enhance the mobility of AMISOM, UNMAS has established a presence at the force headquarters integrated support office of AMISOM in Mogadishu and a joint office with AMISOM in Beledweyne, enhancing technical advice and planning support as it pertains to explosive hazard management and mitigation.

77. The United Kingdom began to deploy military personnel to support UNSOS and UNSOM, further to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 2245 (2015) and an exchange of letters with the Secretariat. The contingent will consist of military engineers, military medical trainers, staff officers, military information analysts, combat-vehicle engineers and logisticians with expertise in ammunition and vehicle management. It is expected to deploy in three phases. The first eight members of the 70-strong contingent were deployed on 17 April.

78. As authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2245 (2015), UNSOS has increased support for Somali national security forces through the delivery of field defence stores to the Somali national army in Mogadishu and its sectors and the provision of communications support. Alongside bilateral partners and AMISOM, UNSOS trained 15 army personnel in the use of HF/VHF radio communication equipment to improve interoperability with AMISOM during joint operations. In addition, UNSOS conducted four medical evacuations for national police officers during joint operations with AMISOM.

79. The trust fund in support of the Somali national army has an available balance of only $8 million, which is sufficient to support army operations for the next six months. The trust fund balance for contributions in the support of AMISOM remains at $1.6 million, which is earmarked for continuing projects. Without additional resources, UNSOS will be severely hampered in its ability to support the army and AMISOM at this crucial juncture.

Human rights due diligence policy

80. With regard to the human rights due diligence policy, the two compacts of UNSOS highlight the commitment of the Support Office to engage in coordination forums, share information, facilitate monitoring and risk assessments, and build AMISOM into a preventive measure.

81. One such preventive measure is the conduct of human rights due diligence policy training during joint predeployment visits. In March, two training events were held for the Ugandan and Burundian armies. Almost 80 commanders and senior officers were briefed on human rights, international humanitarian law and the obligation of the United Nations to implement the policy, as well as the implications for support for AMISOM. All participants signed forms acknowledging that they would ensure troops under their command were similarly briefed and committed themselves to ensuring that they would report any allegations of human rights violations or sexual exploitation and abuse through their command chain.

82. In February, during the summit of AMISOM troop-contributing countries in Djibouti, the countries acknowledged the importance of strict compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law during operations and identified the human rights due diligence policy in the final communiqué as a tool to help to ensure compliance. The joint AMISOM-United Nations working group on the policy met in March and discussed mitigation measures for the human rights violations against AMISOM, information-sharing with the United Nations within the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell framework and the need for background checks of incoming commanders and senior officers.

VI. United Nations presence in Somalia

A. Expansion

83. The staff ceilings remained the same throughout Somalia, with the exception of Mogadishu, where a new commercial accommodation facility was opened. Therefore, in the capital, the staff ceiling for international personnel increased from

415 to 445. As a result, the overall staff ceiling for the country increased from 592 to 622.

B. Integration

84. UNSOM continues to implement its mandate through a close partnership with the United Nations country team and, in several areas, through fully integrated joint operations. Of note during the reporting period, the UNSOM-UNDP Integrated Electoral Support Group delivered fully integrated electoral support to the National Independent Electoral Commission and to regional consultations on the 2016 electoral process. Similarly, the global focal point arrangement in police, justice and corrections enabled joint UNSOM-UNDP operations in support of the Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme. In both cases, a UNDP-contracted deputy supports the responsible head of unit in UNSOM, allowing for a seamless connection between technical advice, political support and programming.

85. Work is continuing in order to deepen collaboration in the area of human rights and the protection of women and children. On 17 March, the senior management group, comprising UNSOM, UNSOS and the United Nations country team, decided to integrate specialized protection functions into the human rights component.

C. Staff safety and security

86. The Security Management Team maintains a robust presence in Somalia to enable United Nations staff to stay and deliver in challenging security circumstances.

87. During the reporting period, United Nations staff in Mogadishu, Kismaayo and Baidoa were indirectly affected by stand-off attacks involving mortars and B-10 rockets. There is an increased risk to United Nations and other air operations in Somalia from low-yield explosives concealed in electronic equipment and smuggled on to aircraft. The Security Management Team also closely monitored reports of Al-Shabaab movements and operations, in particular in Shabelle Hoose, with possible implications for the United Nations.

88. In the light of the above risks, contingency planning linked to specific indicators and triggers was updated and relevant issues discussed with the African Union and AMISOM. Two United Nations air operators, the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service and UNSOS, reviewed procedures in support of the Federal Government Civil Aviation Authority. In addition, UNSOS commissioned an independent assessment of aviation safety by the International Civil Aviation Organization. A review of security arrangements at airport terminals in Somalia, including enhanced passenger, baggage and cargo screening, is continuing. A routine crisis management simulation exercise was conducted in Mogadishu in April.

VII. Observations

89. Somalia is undergoing a critical period in its political transition. Security and political challenges are affecting the pace of progress in key priorities outlined in Vision 2016 of the Federal Government. Nevertheless, there is now momentum to plan and undertake an indirect, limited-franchise election in 2016. Doing so will be a milestone marking decisive progress and pointing the way to more democratic and inclusive politics in the coming years. However, with the mandates of the legislature and executive expiring later this year, time is not on our side. I therefore urge Somali stakeholders to proceed expeditiously with all the practical preparations for the electoral process.

90. In the coming period, it is essential that effective measures be taken to address the security threat represented by Al-Shabaab, especially to ensure that the electoral process is conducted in a safe and timely fashion. I am concerned, in particular, about Al-Shabaab build-up in Shabelle Hoose and parts of Shabelle Dhexe, which has an impact on the security situation in Mogadishu and is increasing the frequency of asymmetric attacks. This development has also created a more restrictive operating environment for the United Nations and other international partners.

91. I pay tribute to AMISOM, the national army and their allied forces for their continued efforts under difficult conditions, as well as the sacrifices that they continue to make in the interest of peace and stability in Somalia. I reiterate the need to maintain the pressure on Al-Shabaab through a comprehensive approach to the threat of violent extremism.

92. I am concerned about the gaps in funding for AMISOM operations, which risk undermining the effort to regain momentum in efforts to combat Al-Shabaab. I urge Member States to step up their support to AMISOM to help to cover costs incurred during joint operations, in particular for the reimbursement of troop stipends. The reduction in stipends for AMISOM personnel as at 1 January 2016 has resulted in a financial deficit for the African Union and AMISOM. The United Nations remains committed to assisting the African Union in finding a suitable solution for the sustainable and predictable funding of AMISOM stipends.

93. Stronger AMISOM command and control structures are crucial to improving its operational effectiveness. In this regard, I welcome the concurrence of AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries, as stated at the summit of Heads of State, held in Djibouti on 28 February, that all air assets should fall under the supervision of the Head of Mission. Doing so will not only reduce the burden on logistical operations, but also facilitate commercial activities that are critical for community recovery, as well as facilitate the effort to secure major supply routes.

94. Ultimately, it is critical that the Somali security sector be developed to a level at which it would be able to assume security responsibilities in the country. I therefore welcome the focus of the Federal Government on developing a federal security architecture, while noting that questions around the command and control of the security forces will require political engagement at the highest level. In this context, the agreement on the main parameters of a new policing model for Somalia constitutes a major milestone in creating viable police services in a federal Somalia and provides a framework for coordinated international assistance. I urge the Federal Government to ensure regular and predictable payment of Somali national

army salaries, which remains a central requirement for effective security sector reform.

95. I applaud the efforts undertaken by Somali actors to reach an agreement on a 2016 electoral model and 2020 political road map. I welcome, in particular, the decision to reserve 30 per cent of the seats in both houses of the Federal Parliament for women. The United Nations stands ready to provide the support necessary for the realization of this critically important objective. I welcome the commitment made at the High-level Partnership Forum in Istanbul that there must not be any impediments to the timely implementation of the electoral process and call upon all Somali stakeholders to advance preparations.

96. I encourage the Federal Government to prioritize financial support to the National Independent Electoral Commission to facilitate the timely recruitment and capacity development of the Commission's secretariat, which will be required to initiate the planning of electoral preparations for the constitutional referendum and universal elections.

97. I note that, while some progress has been made over the reporting period on state formation and reconciliation, the overall federalization process is lagging. In particular, lack of progress on the state formation process in Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe is of concern. I urge all stakeholders to engage in constructive dialogue and advance the social reconciliation efforts necessary to enable the formation of an interim regional administration in Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe without further delay.

98. I welcome the progress made in advancing the review of the Provisional Federal Constitution and encourage its speedy conclusion. I also welcome the continuing efforts to include the federal member states, in particular Puntland, in this process and urge the greater inclusion of civil society.

99. I note the substantial reduction in the number of allegations of human rights violations against AMISOM since the previous reporting period. However, military air strikes that affect the civilian population continue to be a source of serious concern. I am also concerned about allegations of human rights violations by national security forces and the blurring of identities between them and their AMISOM counterparts during military operations. This is both a serious accountability issue and has an impact on the reputation of AMISOM, the African Union and the United Nations. I urge strict compliance with international humanitarian law during joint military operations and prompt and independent investigations into allegations of violations.

100. Looking ahead, it is critically important to ensure a coordinated and appropriately resourced strategy for community recovery, one that delivers the core functions of the State to newly recovered areas. These efforts need to demonstrate the value of the role of government institutions to a generation of citizens who have grown up in the absence of a State. To this end, I welcome both the launch of the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance and the use of the Development and Reconstruction Facility national window.

101. The current drought induced by El Niño — in Puntland and Somaliland remains a concern to humanitarian partners. There is an urgent need to ensure that humanitarian funding is commensurate with assessed needs in the affected regions. The humanitarian appeal remains underfunded, at only 16 per cent of the $885 million required. Humanitarian partners require $105 million immediately to

provide critical life-saving assistance to more than 1 million people in Puntland and Somaliland over the coming six months.

102. I pay tribute to my Special Representative, Michael Keating, my two Deputy Special Representatives and the staff of UNSOM, UNSOS, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and other international and regional organizations in Somalia for their continued hard work under challenging conditions. I also thank the African Union, AMISOM, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the European Union and other development partners for their sustained support. Our partnership must endure and continue to deepen in the quest for lasting peace and stability in Somalia.


SOMALIA
DJIBOUTI
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
GULF OF ADEN
INDIAN OCEAN
Djibouti
Saylac
Dikhil
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AWDAL
Boorama
Baki
Bullaxaar
Berbera
WOQOOYI GALBEED
Hargeysa
Togwajaale
Burco (Burao)
Oodweyne
Kirdh
TOGDHEER
Karin
Xiis
Maydh
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SANAAG
Laasqoray
Boosaaso (Bender Cassim)
Bandar Murcaayo
Qandala
Butyaalo
Bargaal
Hurdiyo
BARI
Iskushuban
Xaafuun
Caluula
Breeda
Garadag
Qardho
Dudo
Bandarbeyla
Xudun
Taleex
SOOL
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Laascaanood
Garoowe
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Nazrēt
Hārer
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Xarardheere
BAKOOL
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Mahadday Weyne
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Muqdisho (Mogadishu)
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Qoryooley
SHABELLE HOOSE
Marka (Merca)
Wajir
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Almadow
Jilib
Bilis Qooqaani
Jamaame
JUBA HOOSE
Kismaayo (Chisimayu)
Buur Gaabo
Garsen
Lamu
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
SOMALIA
National capital
Regional capital
Town, village
Airport
International boundary
Regional boundary
Undetermined boundary
Main road
Track
Railroad
0 50 100 150 200 km
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Map No. 3690 Rev. 10.2 UNITED NATIONS
May 2014
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations A/70/867–S/2016/431

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
10 May 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 5 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 4 May 2016, addressed to you by a representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Mehmet Dânâ (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit Çevik
Permanent Representative

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Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 5 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 21 April 2016 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/70/841-S/2016/364), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertions regarding the "illegally issued two notices to airmen", it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are coordinated with the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus as "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly states "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development,

deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2015 alone, the number of passengers that used Ercan Airport stood at nearly 3,500,000 (compared to 3,250,000 in 2014), while a 7 per cent increase in that number is expected in 2016. Moreover, in 2015, nearly 26,000 planes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure, and around 210,000 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace, a total which is expected to increase by 7 per cent in 2016. In that respect, it must be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are progressing swiftly in a result-oriented atmosphere, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners in the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution of the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/70/868–S/2016/432

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 May 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 7 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to draw your attention to the persistent alarming situation on the Line of Contact between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Despite the calls of the international community to strictly commit to the 1994 ceasefire regime, halt the hostilities and return to the negotiating table, Azerbaijan continues to resort to military actions along the Line of Contact.

To date, the Azerbaijani armed forces have continuously attacked the positions of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army and civilian settlements with heavy artillery, mortars, multiple rocket launching systems and tanks. Since the halting of major hostilities at the beginning of April, the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army has suffered a further 10 casualties as a result of military actions by the armed forces of Azerbaijan. The village of Mataghis and the town of Martakert in Nagorno Karabakh have been continuous targets of indiscriminate shelling by tanks and heavy artillery. I attach images of the inflicted damage (see annex I).

Particularly disturbing are the tactics employed by the armed forces of Azerbaijan of moving their positions within their own civilian settlements, from where they are then able to attack both military and civilian targets in Nagorno Karabakh. I attach images of deployment of the armed forces of Azerbaijan in evidence of such abhorrent tactics by which, in violation of humanitarian law, their civilian population is used as a human shield (see annex II).

Presently, there remains a considerably high concentration of troops and military equipment of the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the Line of Contact, which renders the situation highly precarious and points to the continuation of the aggressive policy by Azerbaijan against Nagorno Karabakh. Thus, Azerbaijan bears full responsibility for the present situation and the risks of its further deterioration.

Furthermore, Azerbaijan continues to obstruct the activities of the team of the Personal Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Chairman-in-Office, in particular obstructing the monitoring of both the Line of Contact between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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Please recycle

Today, it is imperative to preclude the future reoccurrence of what happened in the beginning of April and to ensure that the dangerous attempts to seek a military solution to the issue are effectively curbed. The implementation of the confidence-building measures proposed by the Co-Chairs will certainly serve that purpose, including the creation of the mechanism of investigation for the violations of the ceasefire and the capacity enhancement of the team of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. It is also critical for the international community to urge Azerbaijan to strictly commit to the 1994 Trilateral Ceasefire Agreement between Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Armenia and to the 1995 Trilateral Agreement on the Consolidation of Ceasefire.

Such concrete steps could allow the restoration of the negotiation environment and continue the peace process, to which Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh remain wholly committed.

I kindly request that the present letter and the annexes thereto be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex I to the letter dated 7 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General











Annex II to the letter dated 7 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General



Before
27.04.16
Artillery battery
Settlement
Chemenli

Before
27.04.16
Zengisali
Sea
Settlement

Zengisah
Artillary battery
Settlement
97m
Settlement
93m
Artillary battery
Military installations of Azerbaijani Armed Forces located in close vicinity to populated settlements in violation of Customary IHL (Rule 23, Article 52, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention)

Artillery battery
75m
Zengisali
Artillery battery
75m
Settlement
Military installations of Azerbaijani Armed Forces located in close vicinity to populated settlements in violation of customary IHL (Rule 23, Article 52, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions)

United Nations S/2016/433

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 May 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 6 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 6 May 2016 from the Special Representative of the Syrian National Coalition to the United Nations, Najib Ghadbian (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**
Permanent Representative

16-07715 (E) 160516 160516

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 6 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the High Negotiations Committee for the Syrian National Coalition and as requested by the General Coordinator of the Committee, Riad Hijab, it is my honour to transmit to you a letter dated 6 May 2016 from Mr. Hijab (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian National Coalition
to the United Nations

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

Further to my previous letters regarding massacres perpetrated by the Syrian regime against defenceless civilians, it is with the utmost sorrow and sadness, mingled with extreme pain and outrage, that I inform you of two new massacres committed by the Assad regime and the Russian Air Force on Thursday, 5 May 2016, in the village of Umm Karamil in the city of Aleppo and Kamunah camp in the city of Idlib.

More than 30 people were killed and 125 injured at the Kamunah displaced persons camp in the city of Idlib when the camp was attacked by Russian aircraft. More than 12 people were killed and 20 injured in the village of Umm Karamil in the city of Aleppo when Assad regime helicopters dropped seven barrel bombs on the homes of defenceless civilians.

The Assad regime, along with Russia, Iran and allied mercenary militias, have violated the cessation of hostilities agreement continuously from the day that it entered into force. Today, following the renewal of the agreement, they continue to commit serious violations, which only confirms our view that for the agreement to be of any benefit, monitoring and accountability mechanisms must be created to ensure its implementation.

What has been happening is grounds for both consternation and condemnation. The quantitative and qualitative savagery and lunacy of the killing and destruction, combined with the deafening silence on the part of the United Nations, raise numerous questions.

The preceding is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the daily crimes being perpetrated by the regime and its allies. The regime has surrounded Hama Central Prison after cutting off water, electricity and food, and is mobilizing mechanized forces in preparation for overrunning it and killing everyone inside. All the inmates are prisoners of conscience who were arrested and forcibly disappeared after the peaceful protests in Syria began in 2011.

We hold the regime and its allies responsible for every drop of blood that has or will be spilt, and for the consequences of this out-of-control spiral, which will have extremely dangerous regional and international implications if this silence on the part of the Security Council and the international community continues.

We renew our call on the Security Council to intervene immediately to ensure the safety of detainees in Hama Central Prison and to stop the daily murder being committed by Assad's forces and their allies. The Security Council should enforce its resolutions on achieving a political transition in Syria, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and other resolutions, and should compel the regime to comply with the cessation of hostilities agreement, cease its indiscriminate bombing of civilians, allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance to persons in need, lift the blockade of besieged regions and towns, free detainees and disclose the fates of disappeared persons. That would pave the way for the resumption of negotiations towards the desired political transition.

(*Signed*) Riad **Hijab**
General Coordinator, High Negotiations Committee

Appendix I

The Kamunah camp massacre

Regime warplanes carried out several attacks against the Kamunah displaced persons camp, near the city of Sarmada in the Idlib countryside, slaughtering the civilians who had taken shelter there, the majority of whom were from the town of Anadan in the Idlib countryside.

Initial estimates indicate that more than 30 persons were killed and a large number were injured. Those numbers are expected to rise because of the large fires that broke out among the refugees' tents and because rescue teams have not yet been able to reach the victims.

Number of dead: 30 civilians

Number of injured: 125 civilians

Victims' names: unidentified civilians

Appendix II

The Umm Karamil massacre, Aleppo

In the evening of 5 May 2016, regime warplanes committed yet another massacre.

Regime helicopters dropped more than six barrel bombs on the town of Umm Karamil in the southern countryside of Aleppo, causing a horrific massacre of civilians in which more than 12 persons were killed and some 20 others were injured. Those numbers are expected to rise because some victims remained trapped under rubble, while some of the wounded are in critical condition.

Number of dead: 12 civilians

Number of injured: 20 civilians

Victims' names:

1. Muhammad Abdulhilal al-Muhaymid (civilian)
2. Walid al-Tu'mah (civilian)
3. Adnan Abdulhilal (civilian)
4. Ahmad al-Husayn (60-year-old civilian)
5. Husayn al-Khalaf (24-year-old civilian)
6. Adan Muhammad Hilal (civilian)

7 to 12: unidentified civilians

Video links: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zc1msumXDfw

United Nations A/70/871–S/2016/434

General Assembly
Security Council

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English
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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 97
General and complete disarmament

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 10 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Towards the end of April 2016, the delegation of Ukraine circulated two slanderous documents at the United Nations that had been prepared by Kiev for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington. Russia did not participate in that Summit, and we would not have commented on the false allegations of Ukraine had they not been brought by Kiev to the United Nations.

The anti-Russian attacks in those documents are unfounded and misleading. They are an attempt to shift the blame by turning the facts on their heads.

Russia has responded to those attacks in statements delivered by its delegation at the United Nations General Assembly and in document INFCIRC/876 of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The real concern for States Members of the United Nations should not be the latest fantasies of the authorities in Kiev about Russian intrigues, but rather the extremely alarming security situation in Ukraine itself as a result of the policies of Kiev.

Extremist forces remain active and have arms at their disposal. The most striking examples are the attempt by the Right Sector, an organization banned in Russia, to seize control of a nuclear power plant in the southern Ukrainian city of Energodar in May 2014, and the shelling by Ukrainian armed forces of sites storing radioactive sources in Donbass, including a large radioactive waste disposal site in Donetsk.

The Kiev authorities have decided to persist with attempts to load nuclear fuel produced by a United States company into the reactors of Ukrainian nuclear power plants. That practice has already led to repeated problems with the operation of pressurized water reactors in Ukraine and in other countries.

Dangerous decisions are being taken to switch the output control mode of Ukrainian nuclear power plants to allow for a significant reduction in power output,

something for which the nuclear reactors operating in Ukraine were not designed. That in itself could result in nuclear accidents. The danger is far higher if fuel not designed for the plant reactors is also placed in their cores. In the year of the thirtieth anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities are engaged in dangerous experiments that could threaten the security of the whole of Europe.

The process of building infrastructure for the large-scale disposal of radioactive waste using the money of foreign sponsors, which began following the coup d'état in February 2014, is especially alarming. In particular, in June 2015 the Kiev authorities announced the opening of a central radioactive waste repository in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Over the coming decades, Kiev intends to increase its storage capacity to be able to handle tens of thousands of cubic metres of spent radioactive sources. According to the experts, the capacities being built up significantly exceed the needs of Ukraine itself. It appears that the infrastructure being built is for the storage of foreign waste. In other words, the current authorities have decided to turn Ukraine into a nuclear dumping ground. Responsibility for the very likely adverse consequences resulting from the placement of radioactive waste in a politically and economically unstable territory lies not only with the authorities in Kiev, but also with the States that are providing assistance for the construction of such a storage facility and that intend to use it to store their radioactive waste.

The irresponsible calls of a number of Ukrainian politicians to build and even deploy a nuclear weapon have not gone unnoticed. We understand perfectly well that there is no real capability for politicians in Kiev to follow up on such plans. However, the fact that the Ukrainian elite has those intentions speaks volumes.

Thus, it is not the imaginary complaints of the authorities in Kiev that should concern States Members of the United Nations, but rather the emergence in Eastern Europe of a major source of instability threatening the entire Eurasian continent. And that threat is being compounded because critical and hazardous infrastructure from a once politically stable and developed State is now in the hands of the Kiev authorities.

I would like to take this opportunity once again to draw the attention of States Members of the United Nations to the statement on the thirtieth anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy and modern-day nuclear security in Europe, adopted by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on 15 April 2016.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as a document of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 97, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

United Nations S/2016/435

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 May 2016

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and its presidential statements on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan, and in particular, resolutions 1990 (2011), 2024 (2011), 2032 (2011), 2046 (2012), 2047 (2012), 2075 (2012), 2104 (2013), 2126 (2013), 2156 (2014), 2179 (2014), 2205 (2015), 2230 (2015), and 2251 (2015) as well as presidential statements S/PRST/2012/19 and S/PRST/2013/14, and the Council's press statements of 18 June 2012, 21 September 2012, 28 September 2012, 6 May 2013, 14 June 2013, 14 February 2014, 17 March 2014, 11 December 2014, and 27 November 2015,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Sudan and South Sudan, and to the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and recalling the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Reiterating that the territorial boundaries of States shall not be altered by force, and that any territorial disputes shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means, affirming the priority it attaches to the full and urgent implementation of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and underscoring that the future status of Abyei shall be resolved by negotiations between the parties in a manner consistent with the CPA and not by the unilateral actions of either party,

Recalling the commitments made by the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan in the 20 June 2011 Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, the 29 June 2011 Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of South Sudan on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), and the 30 July 2011 Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission between the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan, as well as the 27 September 2012 Agreements on Cooperation and Security Arrangements, the JPSM's 8 March 2013 decision, and the Implementation Matrix of 12 March 2013, reached by the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), as well as the extraordinary meeting of the JPSM 13-14 October 2015,

Recognizing some positive developments reported at the beginning of this year in relations between the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan on border security,

encouraging progress on improving bilateral relations between Sudan and South Sudan, and *stressing the need* for regular meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) and other joint mechanisms, including the Joint Border Commission and Joint Demarcation Committee, to enable dialogue and coordination on matters of border security,

Welcoming the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan and *urging* the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan to take this opportunity to reinvigorate progress towards implementing the Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area as set out in the 20 June 2011 Agreement,

Expressing its full support for the efforts of the African Union on the situation between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, in order to ease the current tension, facilitate the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations and the normalization of their relations, recalling in this regard the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) communiqués of 24 April 2012, 24 October 2012, 25 January 2013, 7 May 2013, 29 July 2013, 23 September 2013, 26 October 2013, 12 November 2013, 12 September 2014, 31 July 2015, 25 August 2015, and 10 December 2015; the AUPSC press statements of 6 November 2013 and 24 March 2015; and the statement from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on 28 October 2013 and the 24 June 2015 and 14 October 2015 statements from the African Union Commission,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006), 1894 (2009) 2175 (2014) and 2222 (2015) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict; 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012), 2143 (2014) and 2223 (2015) on children and armed conflict; 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel; and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015) on women peace and security,

Stressing the need for effective human rights monitoring and reporting, including of any sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses committed against women and children, taking note that there have been no developments with regard to the operationalization of human rights monitoring in the Abyei Area, and reiterating its concern at the lack of cooperation by the parties with the Secretary-General to this end,

Recalling that its resolution 2086 (2013) reiterates the importance, when establishing and renewing the mandates of United Nations Missions, of including provisions on the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women in post-conflict situations and on children and armed conflict, and emphasizing that persistent barriers to full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), and subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security, including 2242 (2015), will only be dismantled through dedicated commitment to women's empowerment, participation, and human rights, and through concerted leadership, consistent information and action, and support, to build women's engagement in all levels of decision-making,

Acknowledging the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan's acceptance at the 13-14 October 2015 JPSM meeting of the map presented by the AUHIP in November 2011 relating to the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), their agreement that the centreline is only the location of the separation

line between armed forces, as well as the Parties' agreement to activate all mechanisms relating to the JPSM as provided for in relevant agreements, and *encouraging* the parties to delineate or agree on the coordinates of, and demilitarize the SDBZ, including the "14 Mile Area", and to fully implement the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), in accordance with Security Council resolution 2046 (2012) and the AUPSC Roadmap of 24 April 2012, and *underlining* the importance of fully establishing and maintaining effective JBVMM monitoring of the SDBZ, including the "14 Mile Area", and *further urging* the parties to cooperate in allowing the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to fulfil its responsibility to provide security for the JBVMM's mission to monitor the SDBZ,

Noting with concern the absence of local institutions to manage the Abyei Area and lack of progress in convening an Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) meeting since March 2015,

Recognizing the importance of regular dialogue between the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan, *recalling* the United Nations Security Council decision in resolution 2046 (2012) that the parties must resume immediately negotiations to reach agreement on Abyei final status under the auspices of the AUHIP, calling upon all parties to engage constructively in the process mediated by the AUHIP towards final agreement on the final status of the Abyei Area, and stressing that the parties must immediately implement pending aspects of the 20 June 2011 Agreement, in particular to resolve the dispute over the Abyei Area Agreement, and to resolve the dispute over the Abyei Area Council, and immediately establish the Abyei Area Administration and Abyei Police Service,

Stressing that both countries and communities will have much to gain if they show restraint and choose the path of dialogue instead of resorting to violence or provocations,

Commending the continued assistance provided to the parties by the AUHIP, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan, and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA),

Further commending the efforts of UNISFA in effectively carrying out its mandate, including by its ongoing facilitation of peaceful migration throughout the Abyei Area, conflict prevention, mediation and deterrence, and expressing its deep appreciation for the work of the troop-contributing countries, and strongly underscoring the unacceptability of any attack on UN personnel, including the 26 November 2015 attack that resulted in the death of a peacekeeper, and *reiterating* that such attacks should be swiftly and thoroughly investigated, and that those responsible should be held to account,

Taking note of the security situation in the Abyei Area as characterized by the 15 April 2016 Secretary General's report (S/2016/353), and *acknowledging* UNISFA's contribution to enhanced peace and stability since its deployment and *expressing* its determination to prevent the recurrence of violence against or displacements of civilians and to avert intercommunal conflict,

Reiterating its deep concern regarding the public administration and rule of law vacuum in the Abyei Area, due to continued delays in the establishment of the Abyei Area Administration Council and Police, including a special unit to deal with

particular issues related to nomadic migration, which are essential to maintain law and order and prevent intercommunal conflict in Abyei, and in this regard, *welcoming* UNISFA's efforts to support and strengthen community protection committees, and to continue engaging with both governments on this issue,

Noting with concern the continued delay in establishing the temporary institutions and resolving the final status of Abyei and that the continued threat of intercommunal violence contributes to heightened tensions in the Abyei Area, including those ongoing tensions that prevent UNISFA's and other agencies' Sudanese staff from returning to Abyei,

Urging all parties to refrain from any unilateral action that could aggravate intercommunal relations within the Abyei Area, expressing concern over the continued implications of what the AUPSC described in their 6 November 2013 press statement as "the decision by the Ngok Dinka to conduct a unilateral referendum" and also in this context, taking note that the Government of Sudan proceeded with its April 2015 national elections in Abyei,

Taking note of the information in the 15 April 2016 Secretary-General's report (S/2016/353) regarding completion of earthwork excavation at the Diffra oil installation,

Bearing in mind the current humanitarian situation in which humanitarian actors continue to provide assistance to 139,000 people in the Abyei Area and the importance of coherence of United Nations assistance in the region, and *further stressing* the urgency of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all affected populations,

Affirming the importance of voluntary, safe, dignified return and sustainable reintegration of displaced persons, and of peaceful and orderly migration cycles respecting the traditional migratory routes from Sudan to South Sudan through Abyei, and urging UNISFA to continue to take measures as necessary to ensure security in the Abyei Area in accordance with its mandate,

Recalling its resolution 2117 (2013), and expressing grave concern at the threat to peace and security in Abyei arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, *welcoming* the completion of infrastructure, systems, and policy for weapons confiscation, storage and destruction, and *calling on* UNISFA to ensure adequate protection of this infrastructure,

Expressing concern about the residual threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war in the Abyei Area, which hinders the safe return of displaced persons to their homes, safe migration, and livelihood activities,

Taking note of the 15 April 2016 Secretary-General's Reports (S/2016/353), including the Secretary-General's call on the parties to renew efforts to address the issues that have remained unresolved, implement the 20 June 2011 Abyei Agreement, and ensure full and permanent withdrawal of all unauthorized forces from the Abyei Area,

Recalling that the Security Council welcomed in resolution 2205 (2015) the decision of the Secretary-General to appoint a civilian head of mission,

Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei and along the border between the Sudan and South Sudan continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend until 15 November 2016 the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1990 (2011) and modified by resolution 2024 (2011) and paragraph 1 of resolution 2075 (2012), and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, further decides to extend until 15 November 2016 the tasks of UNISFA as set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 1990 (2011), and determines that for the purposes of paragraph 1 of resolution 2024 (2011), support to the operational activities of the JBVMM shall include support to the Ad Hoc Committees, as appropriate when so requested by consensual decisions of these mechanisms, within UNISFA's operational area and existing capabilities;

2. *Takes note* of the stated intention by both sides to hold another AJOC meeting, *regrets* the meeting has not yet taken place, and *urges* the holding of more productive meetings to ensure steady progress on the implementation of previous AJOC decisions and the 20 June 2011 Agreement, and *welcomes* African Union initiatives to support this goal and *encourages* its continued engagement, and requests the Secretary-General to provide an assessment of progress on these issues in his regular reports;

3. *Underscores* that continued cooperation between the Government of Sudan and Government of South Sudan is also critical for peace, security and stability and the future relations between them;

4. *Further reiterates* its demand that Sudan and South Sudan urgently commence the establishment of the Abyei Area Administration and Council, including by resolving the deadlock over the composition of the Council, and constitute the Abyei Police Service, to enable it to take over policing functions throughout the Abyei Area, including the protection of oil infrastructure, in accordance with their commitments in the 20 June 2011 Agreement;

5. *Expresses* renewed concern regarding the delays and stalled efforts to fully operationalize the JBVMM, *takes note* of the Secretary-General's benchmarks and recommendations regarding JBVMM operations, *takes note* that continued investment in achieving full operational capability of the JBVMM should be based on a set of conditions, including resolution of the dispute over the SDBZ, resumption of border demarcation discussions, occurrence of regular meetings of the JPSM, and granting of full freedom of movement, and *calls on* both parties to demonstrate full commitment to implementation of their border arrangements and take the necessary steps to this effect, including by swiftly holding a new meeting of the JPSM to take the operational decisions related to their agreement on the SDBZ;

6. *Decides* to maintain the troops authorized by resolution 2104 (2013) already deployed, and that the remaining authorized forces continue to be deployed dependent on the evolution of the JBVMM, to enable UNISFA to provide required force protection to the JBVMM and to enable UNISFA to fully support the JBVMM to conduct extended operations into the SDBZ as soon as possible, and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council fully updated on the status of deployment as part of his regular reporting cycle;

7. *Calls upon* the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan to make timely and effective use of the JBVMM, JPSM and other agreed joint mechanisms to ensure the security and transparency of the SDBZ, including the "14 Mile Area";

8. *Urges* renewed efforts to determine conclusively the SDBZ centreline on the ground, and reiterates that the centreline of the SDBZ in no way prejudices the current or future legal status of the border, ongoing negotiations on the disputed and claimed areas, and demarcation of the borders;

9. *Underscores* that UNISFA's protection of civilians mandate as set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 1990 (2011) includes taking the necessary actions to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of such violence;

10. *Condemns* the intermittent presence of South Sudan security service personnel and the deployment of Diffra Oil Police units in the Abyei Area, in violation of the 20 June 2011 agreement, as well as any entry of armed militias into the territory, and reiterates its demands that immediately and without preconditions the Government of South Sudan fully redeploy its security service personnel from the Abyei Area and that the Government of Sudan redeploy the Oil Police in Diffra from the Abyei Area, and *further reiterates*, in accordance with relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1990 (2011) and resolution 2046 (2012), that the Abyei Area shall be demilitarized from any forces, as well as armed elements of the local communities, other than UNISFA and the Abyei Police Service;

11. *Supports* the AJOC's 3 May 2013 and 30 March 2015 decisions on Abyei's status as a weapons-free area, underscores the AUPSC's concern in its 7 May 2013 Communiqué over reports that various communities living in Abyei are heavily armed, *recalls* that the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area stipulates that Abyei should be a weapons-free area and that only UNISFA is authorized to carry weapons inside the area, and in this regard, *urges* the two Governments to take all necessary steps to ensure that Abyei is effectively demilitarized, including through disarmament programs as necessary;

12. *Reaffirms* that UNISFA may undertake weapons confiscation and destruction in the Abyei Area as authorized under resolution 1990 (2011), consistent with its mandate and within its existing capabilities, in coordination with the signatories of the June 2011 Agreement on the Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, the AJOC, and the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities and consistent with the previous AJOC decision to establish the Area as a "weapons free area", and *reiterates* its request that UNISFA, observe, document and report on the movement of weapons into Abyei and the presence, destruction and confiscation of weapons within Abyei as part of the Secretary-General's regular reporting cycle;

13. *Requests* UNISFA to continue its dialogue with the AJOC and with the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities on effective strategies and oversight mechanisms for ensuring full compliance by all relevant parties with Abyei's status as a weapons-free area, with a particular priority placed on the urgent elimination of heavy or crew-served weapons, as well as rocket-propelled grenades, and *calls upon*

the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan, the AJOC, and the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities to extend full cooperation to UNISFA in this regard;

14. *Urges* the two Governments immediately to take steps to implement confidence-building measures among the respective communities in the Abyei Area, including through reconciliation processes at the grass-roots level and supporting UNISFA in promoting community dialogue, *welcomes* continued engagement between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities, and *strongly urges* all Abyei communities to exercise maximum restraint in all their engagements and to desist from inflammatory acts or statements that may lead to violent clashes;

15. *Welcomes* UNISFA initiatives, to support community dialogue and efforts by the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities to strengthen inter-communal relationships and facilitate stability and reconciliation in the Abyei Area;

16. *Welcomes* UNISFA's continued efforts, within existing capabilities and resources, and in close coordination with the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities, to strengthen the capacities of Community Protection Committees in order to assist with management of law and order processes in Abyei and to continue engaging with both governments on this issue;

17. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully with the findings and recommendations following the Abyei Area Joint Investigation and Inquiry Committee's investigation into the killing of a UNISFA peacekeeper and the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief, *welcomes* the 24 March 2015 AUPSC press statement requesting the AU Commission to engage the parties on the findings and recommendations, and *reiterates* the need to enable the two communities to find closure on the assassination of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief, bearing in mind the need to promote stability and reconciliation in the Abyei Area;

18. *Expresses* its intention to review as appropriate the mandate of UNISFA for possible reconfiguration of the force in light of the compliance by Sudan and South Sudan with the decisions set forth in resolution 2046 (2012) and their commitments as set forth in the Agreements of 20 June, 29 June, 30 July 2011 and 27 September 2012, including the redeployment of all forces from the SDBZ, achieving full operational capability for the JBVMM, and the Ad Hoc Committees, as well as completing the full demilitarization of the Abyei Area;

19. *Calls upon* all Member States, in particular Sudan and South Sudan, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement, to and from Abyei and throughout the SDBZ, of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles, aircraft, and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNISFA;

20. *Renews* its call upon the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan to provide full support to the United Nations, including by promptly issuing visas to military, police and civilian United Nations personnel, including humanitarian personnel, without prejudice to their nationality, for entry into Sudan and South Sudan, facilitating basing arrangements, infrastructure construction in the Mission Area and flight clearances, and providing logistical support, *calls upon* the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan to facilitate travel from within Sudan and South Sudan to and from Abyei, and *further calls upon* all parties to fully adhere to their obligations under the Status of Forces Agreements;

21. *Recognizes* that the absence of development projects and the inability to deliver basic government services has had an adverse effect on Abyei populations and *calls upon* the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan, as well as donors to support reconstruction and capacity-building;

22. *Demands* that the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan continue to facilitate the deployment of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to ensure JBVMM freedom of movement, as well as the identification and clearance of mines in the Abyei Area and SDBZ;

23. *Further demands* that all parties involved allow all humanitarian personnel full, safe and unhindered access to civilians in need of assistance and all necessary facilities for their operations, in accordance with international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance;

24. *Strongly urges* that all parties cease all forms of violence, human rights violations and abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, and violations and abuses against children in violation of applicable international law;

25. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that effective human rights monitoring is carried out, and the results included in his reports to the Council, and reiterates its call upon the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan to extend their full cooperation to the Secretary-General to this end, including by issuing visas to the concerned United Nations personnel;

26. *Recalls* resolution 2272 (2016) and *further requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of UNISFA with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council fully informed through his regular country-specific reports to the Council about UNISFA's progress in this regard, including with respect to the implementation of resolution 2272 (2016);

27. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to inform the Council of progress in implementing UNISFA's mandate in one written report, no later than 15 October 2016, and continue to bring to the Council's immediate attention any serious violations of the above referenced Agreements;

28. *Notes* the Secretary-General's efforts to ensure close cooperation among United Nations missions in the region, including UNISFA, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), as well as his Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and requests that he continue this practice;

29. *Decides* to remain actively seized of this matter.